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The Issue 
~ ·'1t 1 Ji ~.,)~I~ 
Ir' . •" •• ""' 
At the simplest, my concern is world food supplies. The 1 ·1 A fi1 ~· ' decline in global grain output in 1972 consequent upon ~ - - ' -
an unprecedented, widespread drought, and the decision in ~ n 
many coumries, particularly the USSR, to maintain livestock · ~ · ~ 
herds, became for many a demonstration Lhac the 18th i 'r~1 
century musings of the Rev. T homas Malthus had finally f(4~~ 
come to pass - world population growing at over 2% per r .~~! 
annum had outstripped demand for food growing at close to I • 
40/o. A World Food Conference was called by the United ~ 
Nations, and various tracts, warnings, articles, pontifi-
cations, and profundications were issued by the mighty and ,. 
the less mighty on the need "to do something" to assure that ' 
all mankind would be free from want. 
It is now about 4 years since food prices began to climb 
in the wake of the 1972 harvest shortfall. The UN Conference 
has come and gone, and although it has left some roiling of the formerly 
tranquil outlook on food, there seems little evidence today that the ferment of 
a few months ago has had a continuing presence on the urgent agendas of 
world issues. 
T here may be good reason for this. The fickle rains in northern Latin 
America, middle Africa, eastern Europe, western, southern, and southeastern 
Asia that depressed the global outturn of cereals in 1972 seem now a transitory 
and coincidental phenomenon. Harvests continue uncertain in all parts of Lhe 
world, but the more normal circumstance of rain in most places, if not in all, 
has returned world cereal production to its approximately normal path of 
growth at 2.8% per year. In international and domestic markets, food prices 
have eased in both absolute and real terms; harvests of North America this 
year hold promise of rebuilding the stocks of grain that have, for the past 30 
years, provided the world with a cushion of security against massive famine. 
But how far can men of perception afford to relax? The International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) estimates that for Asia this year, a 
better than average year by the usual weather standards, grain outturn will 
continue below the longer-term trend by over 2%. Asia, with its teeming 
masses, is where famine stalks with its most fearful tread. Indeed, an IFPRI 
study of current world trends - and I would like to give emphasis to the word 
"current" - of the world demand and supply for grain reveals that by 
1985-86, Asia (excluding China) will have a net deficit of approximately 40 
million metric tons; and the developing countries as a whole will be 85 million 
tons short of balancing indigenous production with demand. 
On the face of it, the mathematics of Rev. Malthus may yec mock the 
seeming ephemeral emphasis on food that world leaders accorded it in 1972 to 
1974. For those who hunger or live in fear of hunger, there is only a little solace 
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that stocks are being rebuilt in North America, or that world prices have eased; 
for those who process the statistics and sort the computer printouts, there is 
little observable evidence to ease the grimness of the prognosis. 
In essence, the world's great uptapped agricultural resources lie in the 
tropics. The territorial areas of the developing countries now produce less than 
one-third of the aggregate global farm output. Within their boundaries lie 
two-thirds of mankind. If present trends continue, the first will approach 
one-quarter and the latter will rise to three-quarters by the turn of the century. 
There is little doubt that the physical environment of the tropical world 
can be exploited for an immense food abundance if the resources of capital 
and technology are mobilized and applied, and if the policies of economic 
development of the developing nations are brought to reflect both the political 
will and the organized political action necessary to foster an agricultural 
transformation of their farm economies and rural societies. 
I need not burden you with a recital of the where and how the tropics can 
be made to produce vastly more. Many in this audience know the story better 
than I. Instead, I want to focus my few remarks on the role Canada can and, I 
think, should play in promoting the transformation of world agriculture. 
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Food Production Strategy 
At the World Food Conference in 1974, someone, probably from FAO, put forth the figure that 
investment in official external assistance to agricultural 
development in the tropics should grow from roughly $2 
billion in 1973 to $5 billion per year over the next 20 or 
so years. The figure is obviously notional. No one can say 
with any pretence to accuracy how much outside help 
developing countries really need to modernize their farming 
sectors. One figure seems as good as the next, especially if it is 
substantially more. Unfortunately, in the years since the 
Conference, there is little else than this notion upon which to 
base a judgment of our progress. In 1974, there was no ,, 
overall global strategy to conquer hunger; in 1976, there is , fl.' 
still no strategy; worse, there is no effort to produce one. (As ' ·' ' 
an aside, it is perhaps worth noting that global strategies are 
being discussed or implemented for the control of nuclear energy, for 
environmental monitoring, for smallpox eradication and malarial control 
among other diseases, for monetary affairs, for ocean exploitation, even for 
controlling raw material prices. Admittedly, these areas are less complex than 
an expansion of world food production, but surely no more important! Yet 
neither the world's instrument for food, the FAO, nor any other UN body or 
other agency has been given a mandate to build the bas is for international 
dialogue on a development program that would ensure all peoples of a future 
free from want.) 
But even without an overall approach co world food problems, it is 
possible to focus on the outlfoes of such a strategy. Like the old milking stool, 
agricultural development rests upon three legs: an available, adapted and 
proven improved farm technology; the economic incentive to reward the risks 
of its adoption by cultivators; and the supply and market structures to bring 
the farmers the inputs necessary for the exploitation of these new technical 
opportunities, and to receive and compensate them for the product of their 
labours. 1 will take each of these in turn. 
Agricultural Technologies 
The International Development Research Centre {IDRC) and the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CJDA) were two of the found-
ing members of the Consultative Group for International Agricultural 
Research (CGIA R) when it was established in 1971. Today, this Group of over 
20 nations, the regional development banks, the FAO, the World Bank, the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and four private foundations 
or fo undation-like agencies, will generate over $80 million in 1977 to support 
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the development and adaptation of new agricultural technologies at 10 
international agricultural research centres scattered throughout the developing 
world. Canada, through the contributions of CIDA and IDRC, is the second 
largest national donor to the CGIAR after the USA. This year, Canada 
contributed more than $5 million to the work of the international agricultural 
research institutes. 
I cannot overstress the importance of this work. Its roots lie in the 
advances made by the four international research centres established during 
the 1960s by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. The work of the Centro 
Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (CIMMYT) on high-yielding 
wheat, which was built on the earlier work of the Rockefeller Foundation in 
Mexico, was recognized in 1970 by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Dr 
Norman Borlaug, the director of the centre's wheat improvement program. 
The development of high-yielding varieties of rice by the International Rice 
Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines has given new hope and new 
potential to rice farmers throughout the world. In the past 5 years, the CGIAR 
has established six new research centres that are now working for the 
improvement of all the major world food crops as well as cattle and sheep in 
the main tropical and semitropical ecological zones. 
Although the work of these institutes is exciting in both scope and depth, 
the technological frontier for tropical agriculture is far from being penetrated. 
And although Canada in playing a central role in this endeavour through the 
participation of biological scientists from Quebec, Guelph, Winnipeg, 
Saskatoon, Edmonton, and Vancouver in the activities of this growing 
network of international centres, the participation can and should be larger. 
For it to be so, greater efforts must be made to enlarge the scope of 
involvement of Canadian scientists, and arrangements must be found to ensure 
the continuity of their participation over the longer periods of time required 
for the completion of important scientific investigations. Both the IDRC and 
CIDA have a responsibility to take this in hand. However, there are significant 
practical limitations on both agencies. Canada is not easily suited to 
conducting applied research that will be readily adaptable to tropical 
environments. The potential contribution of Canadian agricultural research 
scientists to the finding of new agricultural technologies suited to the tropics 
and semitropics is either as co-workers with scientists at international or 
national institutions located in the developing nations, or as investigators 
working in Canada on some of the more basic problems of applied science and 
technology that can and need to be studied in the well-equipped laboratories 
and greenhouses of our own research centres. The IDRC and CIDA have used 
both of these arrangements on several occasions. For the IDRC, however, 
budget size and the basic mandate of its establishment, that is, to assist in 
building in the developing regions an indigenous research capability, focuses 
its aid on the direct support of scientists in the developing countries so that 
they can proceed with the work of adapting to indigenous conditions the 
technologies of worldwide agricultural science. The IDRC associates expa-
triate investigators with developing-country researchers only if there is a clear 
and apparent need for external professional help. And Centre assistance for 
work in Canada must be justified on the basis that it is critically required 
research that can only be undertaken in well- or uniquely equipped centres 
outside the developing areas. 
In effect, the mandate for involving Canadian research workers in direct 
assistance to developing nations falls with greater weight upon CIDA. And 
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although the Agency has been very active in mobilizing Canadian talent to 
assist in generating new technologies for the advancement of agriculture in the 
tropics, it has not yet built a program strategy that would use to the full, and 
on a sustained basis, Canada's capability in the agricultural sciences. The 
reasons are many; three among them deserve mention for they apply to both 
organizations. 
The first is the uncertain relation between the direct flow of federal 
government financing to Canadian universities and institutions of higher 
learning and the flow of provincial resources to the same institutions, whether 
this flow comes directly from provincial budgets or from a pass-through of 
other federal grants to education. In other words, and not surprisingly in 
Canada, the vexed question of federal-provincial financial aid and 
jurisdictions in education is an unwitting constraint to Canada's involvement 
in the promotion of world food security. 
But let me not make too much of this constraint. More important is the 
difficulty of focusing Canadian capabilities on the problems at hand. Canada 
is endowed with both too few and too many institutions of higher learning and 
research competence: too few in the sense that a grant to one raises expecta-
tions in all, and invidious questions of "why did we not receive one also?"; too 
many in the sense that involving all scatters nickels and dimes in a manner that 
assures no one will receive enough to be productive. As yet the Canadian 
academic community has not answered the challenging need to concentrate 
and coordinate the research capacities of the nation in a manner that will 
ensure an effective full employment of national talent on solving difficult and 
complex problems whether national or international. Responsibility for 
devising mechanisms for such a coordination rests with the universities. It is 
only from actions by their administrations and faculties to break and bridge 
the separateness of the nation's institutional structures that a true mobilization 
of Canadian capabilities can be effected. There is little concrete indication that 
these actions are likely in the near future. 
The third constraint is less fundamental, but nonetheless real. It is the low 
status often accorded by the Canadian academic community to research on 
applied technologies for use in the developing countries. Too often I have 
heard the refrain that work abroad or in this country on problems of impor-
tance to development brings little benefit when reviewed by one's colleagues 
assessing promotion prospects or tenure appointments. The young scientist 
especially is influenced by the fear this engenders. But the lower esteem given 
to research on technologies useful to low-income countries affects us all and 
makes it hard to turn our best talent to non-Canadian problems. For some 
reason, many who are, or aspire to be, senior scientists consider the problems 
of the tropical world as being behind the frontiers of present-day science and, 
therefore, solvable by the exercise of more primitive skills, experience, and 
knowledge. The facts are usually the opposite. Work on tropical problems 
most frequently demands the highest of scientific skills and excellence. The 
scientific frontiers of tropical agriculture are sometimes different from those 
of the temperate zones, but it is a special kind of narrowness of outlook and 
understanding that leads some of our scientists and science administrators to 
hold that time spent working on issues not related or applicable to Canadian 
problems adds little to research competence and, therefore, can be given only 
marginal weight in any careful review of professional qualifications. It is an 
outlook that inhibits the mobilization and wholehearted application of 
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Canadian technical capacity for advancing knowledge of how to transcend the 
present technical limits to expanding global food output. 
Economic Incentives 
The second leg of the stool of agricultural progress is the economic 
incentive for developing-country farmers to adopt new methods of agriculture. 
National economic policies for fostering agricultural progress are obviously a 
matter for the sovereign decisions of individual countries. But there is an 
overwhelming body of evidence that points to a singular failure in nearly all 
developing countries to adopt policies that provide an incentive for 
agricultural innovation and modernization. 
The spread of high-yielding varieties in some parts of Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa has demonstrated to even the most confirmed skeptics 
that farmers will respond to personal economic opportunity if the price ratios 
and profit margins are attractive. They seldom are. The economic climate for 
the so-called "green revolution" in Asian grain production in the late 1960s 
was set by highly remunerative prices for farm output and low prices for 
fertilizer, irrigation water, and other inputs. The ratios of prices paid to those 
received gave a strong encouragement for farmers to produce to the maximum 
capacity of their land. This structure of incentives followed several years of 
production shortfalls due to fickle weather. But as soon as the granaries began 
to fill again, the role of incentives in agricultural progress was forgotten, and 
public policies stressed, as they had in the past, the provision of cheap food for 
the urban consumer. 
There seems little doubt that even if new, high-yielding varieties of wheat 
and rice had not been available to launch a "green revolution," grain output 
would have risen in Asia as the rains returned, on the basis of the strong pull of 
profits from food cultivation alone. The reversal of incentive policies 
following the jump in the growth of output in the late 1960s contributed to a 
drop in this growth and provided powerful evidence that the supply function 
for food in the developing nations is responsive to price and profit changes. 
When new technological opportunities are added to an attractive structure of 
economic incentives, the traditional rural economies of the developing nations 
suddenly become alive and suffused with the ferment of change - a fact most 
disturbing to those who argue that developing-nation farmers are stubbornly 
resistant to innovation requiring either a sweeping social revolution or the 
passage of generations to alter significantly their patterns of economic 
behaviour. It just isn't so. Today, we can cite an overwhelming array of 
examples from all parts of the world to prove the contrary. 
If the farmer is responsive to economic incentives, then the logical 
question is why are incentives neglected, especially in the face of significant 
food deficits in so many countries? It is not an easy question to answer. The 
majority of developing-country governments seek the rapid modernization of 
their societies ahd economies, but most conceive of modernization as 
consisting of manufacturing industries and the physical elements and services 
associated with industrial-urban growth. The rural sector is regarded as the 
"traditional" economy from which will come labour for industry, renewable 
raw material commodities for processing or export, and cheap food for a 
growing urban proletariat. In this vision, the rural economy is a supplier of 
resources; it does not compete for investment allocations with the urban, 
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industrial, or other "modern" sector infrastructures. The exploitation of the 
rural economy to build a modern urban-industrial economic base has long 
been a theme of the literature on economic development; it has an honoured 
history in the experience of Western industrial nations; and it is hard to 
envisage an alternative in a world where external aid is meagre relative to need, 
and the material expectations of newly sovereign peoples place heavy and 
insistent pressures on their governments to build national industrial capacities 
that will open nonfarm job opportunities and assure an evergrowing supply 
of industrial produced goodies for local consumption. 
If overall economic development is to be based on the exploitation of the 
farm and rural economies, it is hardly surprising that both investment finance 
for agriculture and incentive policies for greater farm production have little 
place in the plans and programs of Third World nations. Of course, there is 
always a part of any national economic plan devoted to the importance of 
agriculture and the rural economy - no politician can ignore the 60-80% of 
the population living and working in the rural regions of the nation - but 
aside from its prominent position as the third or fourth chapter in the plan 
document and the always careful assurance that agriculture and rural 
development have the paramount call on the resources and talents of the 
nation, the implementation of this part of the plan invariably lags behind, 
often far behind, the efforts made on power, ports, steel plants, city 
expansion, and the many other aspects of a "modern" state. 
The result, after 30 years of building new countries, has been a failure of 
their agricultures to meet confidently and adequately the basic needs of their 
peoples. A development strategy based on the exploitation of the traditionally 
poor "traditional" sector has produced poor nations. The economic surplus of 
national rural hinterlands has fallen far short of what is needed to finance 
national aspirations for modernity. The bankruptcy of this exploitive policy is 
evident in the grim outlook for world food supplies in the next quarter century. 
But this policy will likely not change, and, within the framework of the poor 
economies of the developing countries, cannot change, unless developed 
nations exercise greater assertiveness than they have in the past to direct a 
larger portion of their assistance to the support of agricultural modernization 
in Third World nations, and greater leverage on these nations to formulate and 
implement public policies that will encourage and reward farmer innovation. 
A manifestation of the willingness of the developing-country governments 
to exploit their own farm community for national development is the story of 
food aid, a story in which Canada plays and has played a prominent role. In 
brief, Canadian food aid, that is food purchased in Canada with money from 
CIDA for shipment to developing countries, has risen by over 19% per year 
since 1970. This year it will be approximately $220 million or about 
one-quarter of all CIDA disbursements for international assistance. 
Food aid shipped to countries or regions that are experiencing genuine 
famine emergencies is both necessary and laudable. Knowing this aid is or will 
be available should difficulties arise provides for low-income nations a sense of 
security against complete helplessness should disaster strike. And although this 
sense of security may be used by some governments to slight their own farm 
development with an untroubled conscience, this is not a valid criticism of 
emergency relief generously given by those who have an overabundance to 
those who are needy from events of tragedy. One cannot but be thankful that 
this nation can offer such succor; may we be able to do so in future. 
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But not all Canadian food aid goes to assist those in emergency need. 
Some of it is shipped as general economic assistance to poorer countries. The 
grain shipments are received by the aided government, sold to their local 
citizens through national marketing channels with the proceeds being used to 
augment general revenues or for development projects agreed on between 
Canada and the partner nation - seemingly a most sensible arrangement, 
using food grown in Canada, of which we have a surplus, as an external 
resource to help modernize a poor country. But who bears the real cost of the 
transfer - someone must, for there is no free lunch even in a food-surplus 
nation: the Canadian taxpayer for one, they buy the grain; the Canadian 
consumer for another, they pay higher prices in Canada for the added market 
demand from CIDA. Most important for our purposes, however, is the cost 
borne by the farmers in the recipient nation: the price for their product is 
depressed by the foreign supply, a factor critical for incentive to innovate. The 
distribution of benefits, too, is interesting. These accrue to the Canadian 
farmer in the form of higher prices; to the urban consumer in the recipient 
nation in the form of lower prices; and to the revenues of the recipient country 
from the sale of the grain. In keeping with a policy of exploiting the rural 
economy as an avenue for development, the urban consumer is benefited by 
food aid at the cost of lower farm returns and sapped incentives for domestic 
production. In my view, our offers of food aid as general economic assistance 
carry with them an inherent threat to the building of a viable agriculture in the 
developing regions of the world. 
Economic incentives for the families who produce the world's food and 
on whom agricultural progress rests are a much neglected part of an overall 
strategy for expanding global food production. They must receive attention in 
the future, and Canada, as a food-abundant nation, must be careful that its 
actions, however well and generously motivated, do not erode or destroy these 
important forces for innovation and development. 
Infrastructures of Farm Services 
The third leg of the stool is establishing the complex and extensive 
networks of roads, transport systems, communications, depots, extension 
services, credit facilities, processing and storage plants, even the industrial 
base needed to service and serve a modern agricultural industry and the rural 
people who are the fundamental labour force of that industry. 
To give some idea of the magnitude of the task, we can draw examples 
from many parts of the world. The cost of developing the vast irrigation 
potential of the Indo-Gangetic plain of India, including major river 
developments in Nepal, is estimated at between $20 and $40 billion, roughly 
half of the annual gross national product of that subcontinent country. 
Although such an investment might almost double the world's potential to 
produce grain, for India to announce and plan a development program for this 
purpose would be roughly equivalent to the Government of Canada 
announcing its intention to launch a development program, say in the North, 
that would cost a projected $90 billion. Indeed, in Canada one-tenth of this 
amount for a pipeline is cause for a national debate! It would be absurd for us 
to plan on such a scale, and equally absurd for India. 
For the nations of the African Sahel, the problems are even greater. It has 
been proposed that if between $20 and $25 million were spent over the next 
30-50 years, it would permit the development and exploitation of the five 
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major Sahelian rivers, the Lake Chad basin, and the underground water 
reserves that lie beneath this arid land to enable these very poor countries to 
assure a long-term abundance of crop and livestock output relatively free of 
the recurrent threat of drought. It is a development dream as far as these 
nations are concerned. The price tag is more than 10 times as large as the total 
gross annual production of the countries involved. 
And the catalog could go much further. In all cases, the costs would be 
heavy and the national capacities to meet them too minimal to matter. 
The fact is: agricultural modernization and development is expensive and 
the countries who need and would benefit most from its acceleration are too 
poor to finance its undertaking. The potential to feed the world, and feed it 
well with secure supplies, is clearly open to mankind; the resources to seize 
this potential lie, in the main, with the developed, industrial nations. In the 
past 4 years, these nations have contributed roughly $2.6 billion per year to 
agriculture and rural development, and to the development of agriculturally 
important industries and irrigation infrastructure. It is a large amount; but it is 
also less than 20Jo of the military expenditures made by the same countries. In 
fact, it is about equal to the 1975 net profits of the Exxon Corporation, and 
only two-thirds of the gross sales of the giant General Foods Corporation. 
What has Canada contributed to this endeavour? The figures are not 
easily traced through the many categories of Canadian assistance. For 
example, between 1969 and 1975, CIDA contributed more than $80 million to 
the support of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as religious 
charities, private assistance groups, etc., that have extensive overseas 
programs of aid, assistance, and relief. Many of these groups give help to farm 
development projects; perhaps as much as $10 million of the NGO sum went 
for these purposes. Canadian programs of technical assistance also have an 
important focus on agriculture, either directly or indirectly. Canada's 
substantial assistance to multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, the 
United Nations Development Program, the Asian Development Bank, and so 
on, enable these agencies to build their record of contributions to agricultural 
development through their operations. (In total, multilateral agencies of this 
type account for about 550Jo of the $2.6 billion of total annual assistance from 
the industrial nations allocated to agriculture and rural development.) And 
there are many indirect elements of CIDA support that go through food aid, 
debt relief, and spin-offs from projects in other sectors that have a direct or 
indirect impact on agricultural and rural development in the recipient nations. 
This means that whatever CIDA lists as direct assistance to agriculture will 
understate the total Canadian contribution by a significant amount. 
Nevertheless, it is in the direct CIDA help for world agricultural development 
that the play of Canadian policy for the world's future food supply is to be 
found. Although the record is not one about which to be overly boastful, it is 
one we can view with pride. 
In 1974, CIDA disbursed close to $55 million for agriculture and rural 
development, approximately 11 OJo of all disbursements on bilateral aid, that is, 
aid given directly from Canada to recipient nations. In 1975, this amount rose 
to close to $72 million, an increase of 31 OJo and almost 140Jo of total bilateral 
assistance. In CIDA's program classification, assistance to agriculture rates 
fifth after aid to transportation, potable water supplies, education, and electric 
power development. And if each of these categories were carefully dissected, it 
would be found that a substantial portion of this assistance would have a direct 
impact upon the rural and farm populations of the recipient nations. 
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A Future Role for Canada 
But it is not the record chat wiJI dominate the remainder of my remarks. I want now to turn to the future role 
thar Canada might play in fostering world agricultural 
development. I have already suggested that more might be 
done to involve Canadian scientists and research institutions 
in the international efforts to develop new farm technologies. 
I believe also that Canada can provide a new leadership for 
rich and poor nations alike in setting a course that will assure 
the world's peoples of their food supplies well inco the next i.. .... .,.~ID 
century. 
Within the developing regions of the world, the demand 
for food is met mainly through the consumption of cereals. 
This demand increases as the sum of population growth and 
the degree to which the desire for better diets can be filled 
from an expanding personal economic affluence. Population 0,._··.-::iL"'-..-u 
growth seems relatively insensitive to short-period pressures of public policy. 
Various projeccions can be made about the rate of growth and level of personal 
disposable income in developing countries. Assembling the councry statistics 
and projeccing forward on the basis of a probable level of income growth in 
each developing country, the IFPRI staff estimates that to close the gap by 
1985 between the growth in cereal supplies and the growth in their demand will 
require a 500Jo increase in the rate of growth of grain production, that is, from 
roughly 2.80Jo per year to over 4.250Jo. 
I have indicated that this seems technically and physically possible but 
only at a major cost in resource allocations to the agricultural modernization 
of the tropical nations. I have pointed to the development of an infrastructure 
of services for the innovating farmer as being the most expensive pan of that 
modernization process. But when one digs behind just what elements of this 
infrastructural development should be stressed, the picture varies markedly 
from region to region, country to country, and even between parts within the 
same nation. On the Gangetic plain of India, the immediate need is for a 
massive investment in irrigation and drainage; in the sub-Saharan Sahelian 
zone of Africa it is for transport, livestock watering wells, range rehabilitation, 
and irrigation development in a program that carefully articulates activities in 
sequence and in concurrence over various geographic areas; in many parts of 
Latin America, transportation, farm supply, and market depots are the 
greatest need; on the island of Luzon in the Philippines, the most pressing 
requirement is improved transportation, farm credit institutions, and better 
systems of water management, and so on. In each case and for each geographic 
zone, there is a determinable development strategy that will push farm 
production to new levels. In many areas, the rate of return in terms of more 
food produced to the investments needed, at least with present technologies 
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and infrastructural costs, will be low. In a world concerned with the urgency of 
expanding its food supplies, these areas must be accorded a low priority. But in 
many other areas, the returns will be high if the infrastructural investments 
build upon each other to reinforce and complement the purposes of each. This 
is the essence of a global food development strategy. It will be built from a 
compilation of geographic development opportunities with appropriately 
phased programs to create the physical appurtenances and institutional 
capabilities to assist and support an innovative agriculture. If these 
opportunities are grasped and combined with suitable research into new farm 
production technologies and policies of economic incentives for their 
adoption, the total configuration will hold the promise of a secure food future. 
Unfortunately, there are no signs that any agency is even beginning the 
long, hard study necessary to produce the component pieces of such a strategy. 
Nevertheless, the lessons inherent in building a framework for strategic 
planning are readily transferable to guide the policies and actions of 
international assistance agencies. The World Bank is now actively 
collaborating with several countries to develop rural and agricultural 
modernization programs in which investments will be phased for various 
activities in a manner that ensures an interlocking complementarity, and in 
which economic policies are to be pursued that will be conducive to farmer 
innovation. These are necessarily large investment schemes that will stretch 
over several years. Indeed, in analyzing these programs and the suggested 
proposals from other countries and agencies, there is no evidence that 
development assistance activities that place small amounts of money here and 
there on an ad hoc basis can generate any impetus to a substantial and 
discernible rise in food output. The most frequently cited example of 
successful small assistance is the experience of Asia in the late sixties with the 
"green revolution." Supposedly, the release of large amounts of seed of 
fertilizer-responsive, high-yielding, dwarf varieties of wheat and rice was 
enough to break a significant bottleneck to obtaining a high-output 
agriculture. Although the cost of developing these dwarf varieties was not 
high, a few million dollars in research financing, and even seed supplies were 
relatively inexpensive to acquire, it is incorrect to argue that this cost was the 
only expenditure necessary to open the way to an improvement in grain 
farming. The high-yielding varieties did break a bottleneck. But their 
contribution to output was dependent upon their inclusion in a package of 
farm practices that combined the seed with heavy doses of fertilizer and large 
quantities of water applied at critical times during the crop cycle. The new 
varieties found their most suitable application in those geographic areas where 
investments in the infrastructures of irrigation, market depots, fertilizer and 
seed supply facilities, extension services, and credit facilities had already been 
made. The new varieties required massive imports of fertilizer to attain their 
genetic promise. In 1968, India alone spent over $280 million for fertilizer 
imports, the financing being made available from both multilateral and 
bilateral aid agencies including Canada. In fact, the ingredients of the "green 
revolution" demonstrate forcefully the importance of interlinking large flows 
of international assistance with the capacities of the recipient nations to focus 
and control the ingredients of this assistance so that it flows to the farm level in 
the substance, form, and timing needed to support the innovative production 
decisions of the cultivator. Although the whole episode has looked deceptively 
simple to the outside observer, its success rested upon the careful cooperation 
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of external donors with local government authorities, private industry, petty 
traders, and millions of small cultivators. 
In many respects, the Asian experience with the expansion of wheat and 
rice production in the late 1960s and early 1970s rests upon a unique situation 
that is unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. In few developing regions are the 
infrastructural elements present merely awaiting one or two exotic ingredients 
to break a bottleneck. A secure food future will rest upon the willingness of 
donors to commit large resources over substantial periods of time for very 
ordinary and unromantic things like roads, market stores, fertilizer bags, and 
cement pipe. 
The record of such a willingness on the part of Canada is clear. CIDA's 
list of current agricultural projects shows a commitment of resources and 
technical help for a wide scope of activities worldwide. Total project budgets 
as of March 1976 for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, wildlife, rural roads, 
support for Canadian fertilizer purchases, and so on, total about $300 million, 
an amount that will be paid out for these various activities over the next several 
years as the projects mature. Over half of this is for fertilizer credits that will 
permit recipient countries to buy fertilizer ingredients, particularly potash, in 
Canada. About $16 million is allocated to crop development in 18 projects that 
range in size from $6000 for wheat improvement in Zambia to $5 million for 
rapeseed purchases by Bangladesh. At $20 million each, projects in forestry 
and in fisheries are important components of CIDA's assistance for the 
development of renewable resources in the Third World. Slightly over $20 
million has been allocated to irrigation and well development, and in assisting 
these activities CIDA joins with many other organizations in laying stress upon 
this important aspect of infrastructure creation. In fact, in the majority of 
developing countries the name of the food game is irrigation. The 
characteristic rainfall pattern in the tropics is one of alternating wet and dry 
periods. Tropical food output can be greatly expanded if water is harvested 
and stored in the wet periods and used for irrigation in the dry seasons. 
(As an aside, assistance for the construction of irrigation systems provides 
an excellent example of the complexities besetting external aid agencies who 
seek to accelerate world agricultural development. Irrigation projects have 
been, and are, an important component in the portfolio of activities of most 
international assistance organizations. Many, too many, of these projects have 
been or will be unproductive because of faulty designs, that is, designs 
unsuited to the physical and social environments of the tropical nations. The 
traditional experience with irrigation in the Third W arid has been mainly with 
systems constructed to deliver a little water over a lot of acreage in order to 
ensure a minimal crop in case of drought. Such systems are seldom adequate 
for the needs of high-output farming, which demand the delivery of large 
volumes of water in precise flows within narrow timing limits. Many assistance 
agencies, including the World Bank in its earlier days, and many recipient 
countries have incorporated traditional design norms, not modern needs, into 
their new irrigation works. The result has been the development of costly 
irrigation infrastructures without the capacity to support the modern intensive 
production technologies farmers wish to use.) 
The current array of CIDA projects for agriculture and rural 
development arise from the month-to-month response to requests from the 
nations we wish to help. These requests seek aid for an assortment of activities 
that have little connection with each other. All are undertaken because we and 
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our partners in the developing world have a reasonable expectation that each 
will make a substantive contribution to the economic prosperity and to the 
well-being of rural people in the recipient nation. Although one can disagree 
about some of the judgments that lead to these expectations, such 
disagreements are only matters where men of integrity differ. Much more 
fundamental, to my view, is the fact that the present portfolio of Canadian 
agricultural aid to the developing countries should give way to a portfolio that 
has as its central theme a set of high food-return activities that focus on the 
immediate and emerging needs of national or regional rural development with 
projects that are articulated one with the other, and integrated through time 
and across geographic space. 
I said earlier that I believed Canada could exercise a new leadership in 
fostering world development for food production. This nation has the capacity 
that, if tapped and imaginatively mobilized, could assist the major developing 
nations to identify and prepare the set of projects thar build and interlock into 
national programs for food abundance. Such programs are not expensive to 
design, indeed, the costs in money and talent are well within Canadian 
capabilities. And besides resources and human skills, this nation has a unique 
world status that should be exploited for the benefit of all mankind. Canada is 
the second largest world food exporter; we are a middle power with no 
imperialistic background, trusted by both rich and poor alike; our heritage of 
many cultures and languages, our wealth and income, our scientific and 
engineering competence, our experience in working with developing nations, in 
short for reason upon reason, Canada can take a frontal position in world fora 
and among nations as a country that approaches the problem of assuring food 
for all on a basis that is objective and free from suspicion of national political 
greed. Once Canada has earned world respect for the objectivity and expert 
content of the set of projects identified and prepared with Canadian 
assistance, I believe it will not be difficult to organize the international 
consortia of donor agencies necessary to obtain the commitments and 
assemble the vast resources required for bringing plans to reality. 
In using our capacities we must strive to allocate our talents to the critical 
global food priority regions. South Asia with its close to 800 million people, 
some parts of Southeast Asia, and the climatically vulnerable areas of 
sub-Saharan Africa, are the main geographic regions where harvest shortfalls 
could leave many millions vulnerable to famine; a vulnerability that will 
increase as populations grow, and one that we in North America will find 
increasingly difficult to offset with the bland assurance of a few years ago. 
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Conclusion 
The barrier to expanding world food output is the lack of political will and action by both rich and poor. It is 
not technical and it is not economic. ln the final analysis, 
Canadian help for the development of world agriculture will 
rest on the extent to which we in Canada gear our assistance 
to an established and sustained stracegy that has as its aim the 
fostering of long-term world food security. We have not 
reached this poim yet. We have, however, the mechanisms in -: · · 
--~~"""'"--the IDRC and CIDA to draw upon the full array of global 
experience in agriculture, and we have in the nation the 
capacity to assess and assimilate this experience and to derive 
from it the lessons upon which a Canadian assistance strategy 
can be built. We have the talent and even a little of the -:. ~ • • 
resources (the Canadian aid budget is $1 billion this year), • • .., 
which, if wisely used, can do much to ease the spectre of ',, 
global hunger. And we have the respect as a nation with an immense capability 
in agriculture to set a standard for others as to how talent and resources can 
best be used to augment significantly the world's capacity to feed its peoples. 
We can take seriously the slogans of "no hungry child" that echoed at the 
World Food Conference. We can show by example how these slogans translate 
to reality. We cannot reach the goal alone, but we can stand firm in urging rich 
and poor nations alike to gird for the Jong conquest of hunger that lies ahead. 
And we can insist that all the agricultural resources of the nation be mobilized 
and applied to that task. Canada has an extraordinary record of generosity, of 
willingness, nay, eagerness, to help those who are less fortunate and who seek 
to help themselves. However, the urgent issues before the world demand 
wisdom as well as generosity and eagerness. I believe that collectively we in 
Canada can muster that wisdom. I do not believe it has been mustered yet. The 
time to do so is now. There is little time left if the peoples born and to be born 
are to receive their daily bread. 
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